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Abstract
We model a closed economic system with interactions that gen-
erates the features of empirical wealth distribution across all wealth
brackets, namely a Gibbsian trend in the lower and middle wealth
range and a Pareto trend in the higher range, by simply limiting the
an agents interaction to only agents with nearly the same wealth. To do
this, we introduce a parameter β that limits the range on the wealth of
a partner with which an agent is allowed to interact. We show that this
wealth-limited interaction is enough to distribute wealth in a purely
power law trend. If the interaction is not wealth limited, the wealth
distribution is expectedly Gibbsian. The value of β where the tran-
sition from a purely Gibbsian law to a purely power law distribution
happens depends on whether the choice of interaction partner is mu-
tual nor not. For a non-mutual choice, where the richer agent gets to
decide, the transition happens at β = 1.0. For a mutual choice, the
transition is at β = 0.60. In order to generate a mixed Gibbs-Pareto
distribution, we apply another wealth-based rule that depends on the
parameter wlimit. An agent whose wealth is below wlimit can choose
any partner to interact with, while an agent whose wealth is above
wlimit is subject to the wealth-limited range in his choice of partner.
A Gibbs-Pareto distribution appears if both these wealth-based rules
are applied.
1 Introduction
We are interested in the steady-state income distribution for a closed econ-
omy. Several studies have dealt with this question using a group of inter-
acting agents with different parameters like saving propensity, altruism, and
preferential attachments [1]-[4]. For simple interactions, the wealth distri-
bution is shown to be an exponential or a Gibbs distribution [2, 3, 8].
Empirical data shows otherwise. As early as the 1890s, Pareto has shown
that the cumulative income distribution has a power law trend, P (w) ∝ w−γ .
The exponent γ, also named as the Pareto index or Pareto exponent, for
several countries was found to be 1.2 ≤ γ ≤ 1.9 [2, 8]. However, recent
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studies show that the Pareto tendency is correct only for the higher income
brackets. Real data for the middle and lower brackets shows an exponential
trend [5]-[7]. In this work, we show that we can simulate a Gibbsian dis-
tribution as well as a Pareto distribution with a suitable change in the rule
guiding the transaction. We also show how a mixed exponential and Pareto
law, which is descriptive of empirical data, can also be generated. Previ-
ous works have also produced a distribution that is comparable to empirical
data. In the work of Scafetta et al. [11], the distribution was produced using
three parameters (social index, poverty index, and investment index) in two
mechanisms (trade and investments). In the recent work by Scafetta [12],
the Gibbs-Pareto distribution was obtained by assuming that each agent
has its random tendency to risk a certain portion of one’s wealth in every
transaction. This tendency is called saving propensity. In this work, we
show that there is another mechanism en route to a mixed Gibbs-Pareto
distribution that is based on the assumption that agents’ restrict their in-
teractions based on wealth comparisons. Moreover, we emphasize in this
work that although wealth-limited interactions happen in actual economic
scenarios, corresponding rules are not commonly included in agent-based
models of wealth distribution. We found out that the single most important
rule that gives an anomalous distribution is changing the partnering crite-
rion. By simply limiting the agents’ interaction to other agents of nearly
the same wealth, a power law distribution maybe obtained. And then, by
simply mixing the rules, an exponential shoulder in the income distribution
is established.
2 Methods
Our model consists of 104 interacting agents characterized by wealth w and
transaction range β. Unlike in the work done by Laguna et. al. [8], we
assume that the notion of an economic class, represented by the param-
eter β, is relative, meaning it is dependent on the amount of wealth the
agent currently has. Each agent initially receives a fixed amount w = 1000.
We only simulated a closed economy since we observed that using random
parameters for an open economy, a system where each agent receives an
additional wealth after some time steps, produces the same result as the
closed economy, which is an exponential wealth distribution. At each time
step an agent i is chosen randomly and also a second agent, j, is picked at
random within the whole population or at random within an agent’s eco-
nomic class. For each agent, the value [w ± βw] represents the transaction
range. Wealth exchange is done by first choosing a random value for the
exchange money, dw = ran[0, w], for each agent. This ensures that no agent
would have a negative money, or debt, and to ensure that the system re-
mains conservative. After the exchange, the wealth of the agents would be
2
equal to
ww = ww + dwl (1)
wl = wl − dwl
where the subscripts w and l denotes the winner and the loser respec-
tively. The winner is determined at random without favoring any agent
[8]-[10] and receives the amount dwl. Also, each agent is only allowed to in-
teract at most once per iteration. Agents with 0 wealth were still included in
the exchange. Analysis of the stationary state was done after 500 iterations.
The simplest model, where the selection of partners is random, was done
by shuffling the entire population and then picking agent(i) as the first agent
and agent(i + 1) as the second, where i = 1, 3, 5, . . . , N − 1. In this method,
all agents participate in the wealth exchange process. We have also studied
an open economy using this rule. In this system, we add a fixed amount of
wealth to every agent after a fixed amount of time.
The economic class rule was implemented by including a range which
determines which of the agents i can choose to be the partner. This range is
dependent on the agent is current wealth, i.e. wj must be within [wi±βwi].
The values of β used ranges from 0.1 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1. This model
represents the case when the richer of the agents choose his/her trading
partner.
We consider the case of a more restrictive economic class rule wherein
both agents must fall within each other’s range. In this new rule, agent i is
determined randomly and then agent j would be chosen using the same rule
above. If wj falls within [wi ± βwi], wi would then be tested against agent
j′s range. If wi falls within the range then an agent i and j are paired, if not,
a new agent i would be chosen again randomly from the agents which did
not yet participate in the trading for that iteration. This process would be
repeated until all the agents have already interacted or until all remaining
agent cannot find an appropriate partner. The value of β was also tested
from 0.1 to 1.0.
A mixing of the random rule and the economic rule was also simulated.
For this rule, we assigned a fixed value wlimit which represents the separation
between the poor/middle class and the rich. If wi < wlimit, then agent i
would choose a partner using the random rule and if wi > wlimit, agent i
would choose following the second, or mutual, economic class rule. These
limits represent the case where the rich would only want to interact with
other rich agents while the poor and middle class agents dont care about
the amount of money their partner has.
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Figure 1: The semilog plot of wealth distribution for an unrestricted or
random choice of interaction partners suggests a Gibbsian trend.
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3 Results and Discussion
In all distributions, we consider a Pearson correlation factor R2 > 0.95 to
be a good fit. The obtained probability distribution for the random model
was exponential as expected. The distribution plot for an open economy
follows the same trend as the closed economy. The plots only differ in the
slope, which is expected, since our open economy model can increase the
total wealth to a very large amount. The open economy system that we
simulated includes increasing the wealth of every agent by 100 for every 5
iterations. We also tried increasing the wealth after 10 iterations and also
changing the wealth increase by 200. The comparison of results for the open
and closed economy is shown in Figure 1.
The results when we let the first agent choose a partner within his eco-
nomic class are shown in Figure 2. Here we found a limit where the dis-
tribution shifts to a pure power law. Above β = 1.00, the distribution is
exponential. For values of β < 1.00, the data can is best fitted with a power
law function. When β < 1.0, the distribution shifts to a power law behavior.
At low values of β, the poor agents were left to trade with other poor agents
or at most with middle class agents. A consequence of this is the difficulty
for the poor to improve their state which produces a high inequality between
the lower and upper classes especially at very low values of β.
Figure 3 gives the plot for the case where both agents must be within each
others range before they interact. For this case, we observed the mininum
value of β for the distribution to shift to a power law is high compared to the
previous case. The maximum value obtained in this case was 0.6 < β < 0.7.
The distribution has a power law behavior for values of β < 0.6. The value
needed for β to shift the distribution increases because unlike in the first
rule, where the poor agents still have a chance to obtain a portion of the
rich agents wealth, here poor agents were completely left to interact with
other poor agents. This further increases the inequality between the agents.
Figure 4 shows the distribution function when we mixed the random rule
with the mutual economic range rule. When β > 0.60, the distribution can
be approximated to be purely exponential. However, at values of β < 0.60,
the distribution can be separated into two regimes. At values lower than
the wlimit, the distribution have a dominant exponential dependence while
at values higher than this limit, a power law behavior is more dominant.
The obtained Pareto index using these rules is 0.6 < γ < 0.8, which is sig-
nificantly different from empirical values where the Pareto exponent γ ∼ 2.
This suggest that there are other mechanisms that must be considered to
obtain a steeper power law behavior in order to better fit the real data. For
example, as Chatterjee reported [2] a wealth distribution is obtained with
the proper Pareto exponent when the saving propensity for each agent is
not zero. Nevertheless, we consider our suggested wealth-limited interac-
tion as a more basic mechanism en route to a Pareto wealth distribution
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Figure 2: Log-log plot of wealth distribution at different values of β for the
non-mutual choice of partners. For this case, it is up to the richer agent
to choose the partner. For β < 1.0, the distribution is Pareto with the
exponent γ within [0.64, 0.73].
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Figure 3: Log-log plot of wealth distribution at different values of β for the
mutual choice of partners. For this case, both partners must be within each
other’s range. The plots are best-fitted with a power law function, with the
exponent γ within [0.54, 0.68] for β ≤ 0.6 and within [0.93, 1.18] for β < 0.6.
A phase transition happens for β = 0.6.
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Figure 4: Semi-log plot of wealth distribution at different values of β for the
mixed random and β-based choice of partners. The separation between the
exponential and power law behavior occurs near the specified wlimit=1000.
8
than the saving propensity assumption. Moreover, the wealth-based rule is
more realistic rule and is easier to implement than the rule based on saving
propensity, which is harder to determine in actual situations.
4 Conclusion
In this work, the wealth distribution in a closed economy was studied using
different rules for pairing the agents. By changing only this rule, we were
able to generate an exponential or Gibbs distribution, a Pareto distribution,
and also the Gibbs-Pareto distribution. The Gibbs wealth distribution can
be shifted to a Pareto distribution by imposing that an agent can only
interact with other agents who belong to his economic class. Using the
economic class rule, where the richer of the agents have a privilege to choose
his partner, the obtained maximum transaction range was β = 1.0 which
corresponds to ± 10% of the agents current wealth. However, if we let the
agents fall within each others range before they can interact, the maximum
value of β before the distribution shifts to a power law decreases to 0.60.
By imposing that the poor and middle class agents have different be-
havior when choosing a partner than that of the rich agents, an exponential
or Gibbs distribution is obtained at wealth w < wlimit, and a power law
distribution at wealth w > wlimit. However, the power law exponent, or
Pareto index, obtained here was 0.6 < γ < 0.8. In order to give a Pareto
index closer to the empirical data, other mechanisms must be considered
like considering interactions subject to the saving propensity λ.
We showed that there is another route to a Pareto wealth distribution via
a wealth-limited interation. This is an arguably a more realistic mechanism
compared to the saving propensity rule because in actual conditions, it is
easier to measure and compare the agents’ wealth than to measure an agent’s
saving propensity. Limiting an economic transaction to agents of roughly the
same capacity is similar to categorizing financial derivatives as low, medium
and high risks and enticing clients to buy one of such derivatives according
to their economic means. In the same fashion, imposing the wlimit, is like
setting a minimum joining fee before a customer can participate in a high
stakes transaction. Our results show that these rules on choosing a partner
based on their current wealth is an important factor that shapes the wealth
distribution. As far as we have searched, these simple rules have not been
considered in previous agent-based models of wealth distribution.
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Abstract
We model a closed economic system with interactions that gen-
erates the features of empirical wealth distribution across all wealth
brackets, namely a Gibbsian trend in the lower and middle wealth
range and a Pareto trend in the higher range, by simply limiting the
an agents interaction to only agents with nearly the same wealth. To do
this, we introduce a parameter β that limits the range on the wealth of
a partner with which an agent is allowed to interact. We show that this
wealth-limited interaction is enough to distribute wealth in a purely
power law trend. If the interaction is not wealth limited, the wealth
distribution is expectedly Gibbsian. The value of β where the tran-
sition from a purely Gibbsian law to a purely power law distribution
happens depends on whether the choice of interaction partner is mu-
tual nor not. For a non-mutual choice, where the richer agent gets to
decide, the transition happens at β = 1.0. For a mutual choice, the
transition is at β = 0.60. In order to generate a mixed Gibbs-Pareto
distribution, we apply another wealth-based rule that depends on the
parameter wlimit. An agent whose wealth is below wlimit can choose
any partner to interact with, while an agent whose wealth is above
wlimit is subject to the wealth-limited range in his choice of partner.
A Gibbs-Pareto distribution appears if both these wealth-based rules
are applied.
1 Introduction
We are interested in the steady-state income distribution for a closed econ-
omy. Several studies have dealt with this question using a group of inter-
acting agents with different parameters like saving propensity, altruism, and
preferential attachments [1]-[4]. For simple interactions, the wealth distri-
bution is shown to be an exponential or a Gibbs distribution [2, 3, 8].
Empirical data shows otherwise. As early as the 1890s, Pareto has shown
that the cumulative income distribution has a power law trend, P (w) ∝ w−γ .
The exponent γ, also named as the Pareto index or Pareto exponent, for
several countries was found to be 1.2 ≤ γ ≤ 1.9 [2, 8]. However, recent
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studies show that the Pareto tendency is correct only for the higher income
brackets. Real data for the middle and lower brackets shows an exponential
trend [5]-[7]. In this work, we show that we can simulate a Gibbsian dis-
tribution as well as a Pareto distribution with a suitable change in the rule
guiding the transaction. We also show how a mixed exponential and Pareto
law, which is descriptive of empirical data, can also be generated. Previ-
ous works have also produced a distribution that is comparable to empirical
data. In the work of Scafetta et al. [11], the distribution was produced using
three parameters (social index, poverty index, and investment index) in two
mechanisms (trade and investments). In the recent work by Scafetta [12],
the Gibbs-Pareto distribution was obtained by assuming that each agent
has its random tendency to risk a certain portion of one’s wealth in every
transaction. This tendency is called saving propensity. In this work, we
show that there is another mechanism en route to a mixed Gibbs-Pareto
distribution that is based on the assumption that agents’ restrict their in-
teractions based on wealth comparisons. Moreover, we emphasize in this
work that although wealth-limited interactions happen in actual economic
scenarios, corresponding rules are not commonly included in agent-based
models of wealth distribution. We found out that the single most important
rule that gives an anomalous distribution is changing the partnering crite-
rion. By simply limiting the agents’ interaction to other agents of nearly
the same wealth, a power law distribution maybe obtained. And then, by
simply mixing the rules, an exponential shoulder in the income distribution
is established.
2 Methods
Our model consists of 104 interacting agents characterized by wealth w and
transaction range β. Unlike in the work done by Laguna et. al. [8], we
assume that the notion of an economic class, represented by the param-
eter β, is relative, meaning it is dependent on the amount of wealth the
agent currently has. Each agent initially receives a fixed amount w = 1000.
We only simulated a closed economy since we observed that using random
parameters for an open economy, a system where each agent receives an
additional wealth after some time steps, produces the same result as the
closed economy, which is an exponential wealth distribution. At each time
step an agent i is chosen randomly and also a second agent, j, is picked at
random within the whole population or at random within an agent’s eco-
nomic class. For each agent, the value [w ± βw] represents the transaction
range. Wealth exchange is done by first choosing a random value for the
exchange money, dw = ran[0, w], for each agent. This ensures that no agent
would have a negative money, or debt, and to ensure that the system re-
mains conservative. After the exchange, the wealth of the agents would be
2
equal to
ww = ww + dwl (1)
wl = wl − dwl
where the subscripts w and l denotes the winner and the loser respec-
tively. The winner is determined at random without favoring any agent
[8]-[10] and receives the amount dwl. Also, each agent is only allowed to in-
teract at most once per iteration. Agents with 0 wealth were still included in
the exchange. Analysis of the stationary state was done after 500 iterations.
The simplest model, where the selection of partners is random, was done
by shuffling the entire population and then picking agent(i) as the first agent
and agent(i + 1) as the second, where i = 1, 3, 5, . . . , N − 1. In this method,
all agents participate in the wealth exchange process. We have also studied
an open economy using this rule. In this system, we add a fixed amount of
wealth to every agent after a fixed amount of time.
The economic class rule was implemented by including a range which
determines which of the agents i can choose to be the partner. This range is
dependent on the agent is current wealth, i.e. wj must be within [wi±βwi].
The values of β used ranges from 0.1 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1. This model
represents the case when the richer of the agents choose his/her trading
partner.
We consider the case of a more restrictive economic class rule wherein
both agents must fall within each other’s range. In this new rule, agent i is
determined randomly and then agent j would be chosen using the same rule
above. If wj falls within [wi ± βwi], wi would then be tested against agent
j′s range. If wi falls within the range then an agent i and j are paired, if not,
a new agent i would be chosen again randomly from the agents which did
not yet participate in the trading for that iteration. This process would be
repeated until all the agents have already interacted or until all remaining
agent cannot find an appropriate partner. The value of β was also tested
from 0.1 to 1.0.
A mixing of the random rule and the economic rule was also simulated.
For this rule, we assigned a fixed value wlimit which represents the separation
between the poor/middle class and the rich. If wi < wlimit, then agent i
would choose a partner using the random rule and if wi > wlimit, agent i
would choose following the second, or mutual, economic class rule. These
limits represent the case where the rich would only want to interact with
other rich agents while the poor and middle class agents dont care about
the amount of money their partner has.
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Figure 1: The semilog plot of wealth distribution for an unrestricted or
random choice of interaction partners suggests a Gibbsian trend.
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3 Results and Discussion
In all distributions, we consider a Pearson correlation factor R2 > 0.95 to
be a good fit. The obtained probability distribution for the random model
was exponential as expected. The distribution plot for an open economy
follows the same trend as the closed economy. The plots only differ in the
slope, which is expected, since our open economy model can increase the
total wealth to a very large amount. The open economy system that we
simulated includes increasing the wealth of every agent by 100 for every 5
iterations. We also tried increasing the wealth after 10 iterations and also
changing the wealth increase by 200. The comparison of results for the open
and closed economy is shown in Figure 1.
The results when we let the first agent choose a partner within his eco-
nomic class are shown in Figure 2. Here we found a limit where the dis-
tribution shifts to a pure power law. Above β = 1.00, the distribution is
exponential. For values of β < 1.00, the data can is best fitted with a power
law function. When β < 1.0, the distribution shifts to a power law behavior.
At low values of β, the poor agents were left to trade with other poor agents
or at most with middle class agents. A consequence of this is the difficulty
for the poor to improve their state which produces a high inequality between
the lower and upper classes especially at very low values of β.
Figure 3 gives the plot for the case where both agents must be within each
others range before they interact. For this case, we observed the mininum
value of β for the distribution to shift to a power law is high compared to the
previous case. The maximum value obtained in this case was 0.6 < β < 0.7.
The distribution has a power law behavior for values of β < 0.6. The value
needed for β to shift the distribution increases because unlike in the first
rule, where the poor agents still have a chance to obtain a portion of the
rich agents wealth, here poor agents were completely left to interact with
other poor agents. This further increases the inequality between the agents.
Figure 4 shows the distribution function when we mixed the random rule
with the mutual economic range rule. When β > 0.60, the distribution can
be approximated to be purely exponential. However, at values of β < 0.60,
the distribution can be separated into two regimes. At values lower than
the wlimit, the distribution have a dominant exponential dependence while
at values higher than this limit, a power law behavior is more dominant.
The obtained Pareto index using these rules is 0.6 < γ < 0.8, which is sig-
nificantly different from empirical values where the Pareto exponent γ ∼ 2.
This suggest that there are other mechanisms that must be considered to
obtain a steeper power law behavior in order to better fit the real data. For
example, as Chatterjee reported [2] a wealth distribution is obtained with
the proper Pareto exponent when the saving propensity for each agent is
not zero. Nevertheless, we consider our suggested wealth-limited interac-
tion as a more basic mechanism en route to a Pareto wealth distribution
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Figure 2: Log-log plot of wealth distribution at different values of β for the
non-mutual choice of partners. For this case, it is up to the richer agent
to choose the partner. For β < 1.0, the distribution is Pareto with the
exponent γ within [0.64, 0.73].
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Figure 3: Log-log plot of wealth distribution at different values of β for the
mutual choice of partners. For this case, both partners must be within each
other’s range. The plots are best-fitted with a power law function, with the
exponent γ within [0.54, 0.68] for β ≤ 0.6 and within [0.93, 1.18] for β < 0.6.
A phase transition happens for β = 0.6.
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Figure 4: Semi-log plot of wealth distribution at different values of β for the
mixed random and β-based choice of partners. The separation between the
exponential and power law behavior occurs near the specified wlimit=1000.
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than the saving propensity assumption. Moreover, the wealth-based rule is
more realistic rule and is easier to implement than the rule based on saving
propensity, which is harder to determine in actual situations.
4 Conclusion
In this work, the wealth distribution in a closed economy was studied using
different rules for pairing the agents. By changing only this rule, we were
able to generate an exponential or Gibbs distribution, a Pareto distribution,
and also the Gibbs-Pareto distribution. The Gibbs wealth distribution can
be shifted to a Pareto distribution by imposing that an agent can only
interact with other agents who belong to his economic class. Using the
economic class rule, where the richer of the agents have a privilege to choose
his partner, the obtained maximum transaction range was β = 1.0 which
corresponds to ± 10% of the agents current wealth. However, if we let the
agents fall within each others range before they can interact, the maximum
value of β before the distribution shifts to a power law decreases to 0.60.
By imposing that the poor and middle class agents have different be-
havior when choosing a partner than that of the rich agents, an exponential
or Gibbs distribution is obtained at wealth w < wlimit, and a power law
distribution at wealth w > wlimit. However, the power law exponent, or
Pareto index, obtained here was 0.6 < γ < 0.8. In order to give a Pareto
index closer to the empirical data, other mechanisms must be considered
like considering interactions subject to the saving propensity λ.
We showed that there is another route to a Pareto wealth distribution via
a wealth-limited interation. This is an arguably a more realistic mechanism
compared to the saving propensity rule because in actual conditions, it is
easier to measure and compare the agents’ wealth than to measure an agent’s
saving propensity. Limiting an economic transaction to agents of roughly the
same capacity is similar to categorizing financial derivatives as low, medium
and high risks and enticing clients to buy one of such derivatives according
to their economic means. In the same fashion, imposing the wlimit, is like
setting a minimum joining fee before a customer can participate in a high
stakes transaction. Our results show that these rules on choosing a partner
based on their current wealth is an important factor that shapes the wealth
distribution. As far as we have searched, these simple rules have not been
considered in previous agent-based models of wealth distribution.
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